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THE DARKNESS OF THE CLOAK

(Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr. ASHBROOK) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, the recent disturbing trends in our foreign relations throughout the world point up once again the need for adequate intelligence and the responsibility of the Congress to make the intelligence establishment responsive to our best national interests.

Our distinguished colleague from New York [Mr. LINDSAY] discusses this problem in the current March issue of Esquire magazine. His is a thoughtful, moderate approach to an issue which has too long been beclouded by emotional tirades and irresponsible finger pointing.

I have joined with Congressman LINDSAY in sponsoring legislation to create a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence and I believe that the Esquire article outlines the reasons for its enactment effectively.

Under permission granted, I include the article following my remarks in the body of the RECORD.

AN INQUIRY INTO THE DARKNESS OF THE CLOAK, THE SHARPNESS OF THE DAGGER

(By Mr. Lindsay)

Two major reversals in our foreign policy within the last 3 years have shaken the poise of the Intelligence branch of the U.S. Government to its underpinnings: the abortive adventure at the Bay of Pigs, and the blinding miasma of U.S. policy that arose in South Vietnam during the Diem era.

The immediate dangers past, commentators have sought to unravel the confusing web of influences in both situations. The full truth is not yet known, and may never be. Nonetheless, it seems indisputable that in both cases the three principal instruments of U.S. foreign policy—the State Department, the military, and the Central Intelligence Agency—were at crucial times pulling in separate directions.

The criticism most frequently heard is that the CIA was meddling in policy, undertaking functions that were not its proper responsibility. The charge has been made that the CIA was combining Intelligence gathering with active "operations," a course which carries the risk that Intelligence may be used to support prior operational decisions. It has been alleged over and over that in Vietnam, as in the Bay of Pigs, the CIA, with or without direction from higher authority, became enmeshed in its own intrigues. In the Bay of Pigs, the CIA was found supporting a collection of Batista refugees, apparently without clear direction from the State Department. In Vietnam, it became clear that the CIA was closely alined with and subsidizing the Special Forces run by the late Ngo Dinh Nhu, an elite military force that raided the Buddhist pagodas. Responsible representatives of the press have reported strong disagreements between the State Department and the CIA with regard to policy in Vietnam, and these reports must stand even beside the exaggerations of less-responsible press accounts. The evidence was overwhelming that U.S. policy was confused and that the divisions within agencies were being hung on the public wash line. When later our Government's support swung to the insurgents who ousted Diem, this very possibly meant an about-face on the part of the CIA. The extent of our involvement even then is unknown, but that we were involved must seem quite possible.

Almost every qualified outsider who has examined the history of the Bay of Pigs blunder has concluded that it was founded on a haphazard jumble of foreign policy, Intelligence gathering, and military operations. The CIA appears to have organized and conducted the attempt and also to have gathered the Intelligence data on which the prospects for the attempt were judged. Not only was CIA shaping policy—perhaps understandable because of the absence of direction from policymaking organs of the Government—but that policy was patently at odds with State Department thinking. Without fully rehearsing the baleful events that preceded the Bay of Pigs, it is perfectly clear, to understate the matter, that the President was badly served by the agencies involved.

These premises, like all of my remarks in this article, arise only from material and information available to the public. In respect to such material and information I am in the same position as other representatives of the people in Congress, with very few exceptions. All the more reason for such a representative to speak out.

To state the danger posed by the intermingling of intelligence gathering and operations is not to say it is unrecognized by responsible officials. Able men throughout the intelligence community are well aware of and deeply concerned by dangers arising from the absence of clear distinction between intelligence gathering and operations. The trouble may often start, as Allen Dulles, the distinguished former head of the CIA, recently said, from lack of clear-cut operational policy in Washington. When a policy vacuum occurs, men in the field are almost involuntarily propelled into operational activities which are not their proper responsibility. Sherman Kent, the head of the Board of National Estimates—one of the most influential elements of the intelligence community—makes the point this way: "Almost any man or group of men confronted with the duty of getting something planned or getting something done will sooner or later hit upon what they consider a single most desirable course of action. Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under duress, it is a snap judgment off the top of the head. I cannot escape the belief that under the circumstances outlined, intelligence will find itself right in the middle of policy, and that upon occasions it will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst."

The failures of CIA covert operations are well known. Less well known, and of equally sobering magnitude, are the successes. The CIA, for example, played a key part in the ousting of the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953, paving the way for eventual reform of the pro-Western government of the Shah. Both British and American vital interests had been threatened by the capricious Mossadegh policies, the major threat being to Britain's necessary supply of oil. The successful coup which unseated Mossadegh was of great benefit to the United States and the West.

The following year the virulently anti-American Arbenz regime in Guatemala was overthrown. The CIA was widely believed to have engineered the coup. But for the success of that coup, Soviet-directed communism in Latin America would presumably be far more deeply entrenched than it is today.

Each of these episodes demonstrates, for good or ill, the explosive nature of the CIA's operational involvement in international politics: It is not at all improbable that it will be similarly involved in the future. The cold war will be with us for a very long time; so will the CIA. Accordingly, our democratic government, unused to secrecy, has within it an immensely powerful and extremely expensive secret organization, for the past few years housed in a very large permanent building on the banks of the Potomac. That building represents the institutionalization of the CIA in the Government establishment. More exactly, it marks its positive elevation in status, always important in government. And yet there is no effective check on its activities now. And there was none in 1961.

Few can deny the actual and potential power of the CIA, however carefully it may be held in check by the skillful men who run it. Ours is supposed to be a government of laws, not of men. At stake are questions of war and peace, as the two Cuban crises so clearly demonstrated. All of us at that time took a look into the atomic pit. Decisions can be made at such times and actions taken about which the public is totally in the dark. So be it. As much as we may abhor government by secrecy, as much as it threatens fundamental liberties, we must understand its limited and necessary application in particular circumstances of hot or cold war. Nevertheless, crucial decisions are made for us and in our name of which we know nothing. And all too often secrecy which is necessary breeds secrecy which is unnecessary, at which point the danger becomes nothing less than a threat to democratic institutions, a marginal one at the outset, but potentially a most serious one.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred despite efforts by Secretary of State Christian Herter and CIA Director Allen Dulles to sort out the relations between their two agencies so that the making of foreign policy would be removed from the CIA, and the command of policy kept firmly in the hands of ambassadors in the field at all times. The Herter-Dulles agreement was reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk. More recently, following events in Vietnam during the Diem regime, the President found it necessary to reassert publicly his authority and that of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council over the intelligence community. Collaterally the Secretary of State sought to assure the